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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

October 29, 1985

Anne
No. 84-1184, New York v. Class
(cert. to N.Y. Ct. App.) (argument November 4, 1985)
Question Presented
Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit a police officer, who

has lawfully stopped an automobile for a traffic violation, from
inspecting

the vehicle

identification number

("VIN")

unless the

officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the automobile is
stolen?
Background
This case concerns the Fourth Amendment implications of
police
under

''l'

inspection of
mandatory

VIN's.

federal

and

The
state

VIN

is

a

serial number

regulatory

schemes,

that,

must

be

2.

affixed by manufacturers to motor vehicles that will operate in
the United States.
identify

a

The VIN provides a reliable means by which to

particular

manufacturer,

make,

In

vehicle.

model,

body

type,

manufacture, year of manufacture,
production,

and

production

coded

engine

it

identifies

type,

country

of

plant of manufacture, year of

number

sequence

-

vehicle.

form,

of

the

specific

For all cars produced during 1969 or later, a "public"
ll

....___

VIN must be affixed on the left side of the top of the dashboard
and be viewable through the windshield.
.......

.....

(S 4.6).

....

See 49 C.F.R. § 571.115

.-z

In older cars, the public VIN ordinarily was placed on

the door jamb of the driver's-side front door.
may be engraved on the engine.
all

vehicles

location,

carry

a

Or the public VIN

In addition to the public VIN,

"confidential"

VIN affixed

in an obscure

the position of which ordinarily is known only by the

manufacturer

and

-

confidential VIN,

By

police.

comparing

police can determine

the

if

public

with

the

the vehicle bears an

illegally transferred or altered VIN plate.
~-----

Petr New York State describes why police want to inspect
the VIN.

The VIN is the most effective and reliable means

achieving positive identification of a particular vehicle.

for \~
When

-------------------------------------------------

police stop a vehicle engaged in a traffic or safety violation,
they

have

an

interest

in

identifying

not

only

the

driver

responsible for the violation but also in identifying the vehicle
involved.
paint
only

Because

and with
method

to

the appearance of a car can be altered with

transfer

of

identify

the

license plates,
car.

Moreover,

the VIN may be
the

the

police cannot

ascertain if the vehicle is properly registered unless they may

3.

This

inspect the VIN.
sets

forth

the

VIN.

is so because the registration document
Thus,

to

decide

if

the

automobile

is

properly registered,

officers must compare the actual VIN with

the

on

number

contained

the

registration document.

Similarly,

the card showing that the automobile is insured must be displayed
to officers on a traffic violation stop.

That card relies on the

VIN as the basis for establishing that the particular vehicle is
insured.

In short, law enforcement has an interest in inspecting

the VIN in order to determine if a vehicle is stolen.
Two police
miles per

hour

windshield.

officers observed

above

The

the

officers

speed

resp driving

limit

instructed

in a
resp

car

five

with

to pull

to ten

a

cracked

over.

Resp

obeyed, emerged from his car, and approached the officer driving
the

pol ice

car •

Resp

gave

this

officer

his

registration

and

proof of insurance, and stated that he had no driver's license in
his

possession.

Meanwhile,

the

other

officer

had

approached

resp's car, opened the door, and inspected the left door jamb for
the

VIN.

Since

the

VIN

was

not

located

there,

the

officer

reached into the car and moved papers located on the dashboard in
order

to

view

protruding

the

from

VIN.

beneath

In
the

doing

so,

driver's

the

officer

seat,

saw

seized

a

gun

it,

and

arrested resp.
Resp moved in the TC to suppress the gun.

The TC denied

the motion. Though the officers had no reason to believe that the

-

1/

,,

car was stolen, the TC believed that their action was reasonable

--

in

~ight

light of

of resp's conduct in immediately exiting his
the

fact

that resp had no license

~ar

and in

in his possession.

4

4.

N.Y.

Appellate

dissented,

Division

affirmed

without

One

opinion.

judge

finding the "search" impermissible because "there was

absolutely no predicate for believing the car was stolen."
The

New

York

Court

of

Appeals

reversed.

The

court

1tf11A

concluded that, on the facts of this case, the officer conducted
a search of
from

resp • s

unreasonable

car.

The Fourth Amendment

government

expectations of privacy."
7.

A person

has

no

intrusions

into

"protects people
their

legitimate

such expectation

exposed to the view of passersby.

in

103

S.Ct.

1535.

expectation of privacy
from the outside.
the

officer

undertaken
areas."

who
"to

But

a

1,

locations of his car

Thus, there would have been no

search had the officer merely peered inside resp's car.
Brown,

u.s.

United States v. Chadwick, 433

person

does

have

a

Texas v.
legitimate

in areas of a car that cannot be viewed

Here, the government intrusion accomplished by
opened

obtain

the

car

door

information"

and

and

reached

"exposed

inside
these

was

hidden

Therefore, the intrusion constituted a search.
N.Y. ct. App. then turned to the question of whether the

search

was

justified.

The

court

observed

that

lesser

justification than probable cause might be sufficient to support
police inspection of VIN's.

This was so because a VIN inspection

is ordinarily less intrusive than a full-blown search and because
the police have a compelling interest in positive identification
of vehicles.

was(gi'

The court did not decide this issue for here there

~~ion ~~

The TC decided that

the search was reasonable because resp got out of his car and he
had

no

license.

But

a

l

driver's

emergence

from

his

car

Jtq

~
~

~*-"'
upaf1
c~4
(___...;>

5.

being stopped by

the police did not suggest criminal activity.

And the officer who searched for
time he did so,

the VlN was not aware,

r~
The

that resp lacked a license.

at the

.

sole pred1cate

for the VlN search was resp's ncommission of an ordinary traffic

--

infraction.n
justify

ln the view of N.Y. Ct. App., that offense did not

the

VlN

inspection.n

My

reading

of

N.Y.

Ct.

App.'s }

opinion suggests that the court would require that officers have

Yt1
IJUW'

nreasonable

suspicionn

that

a

car

is

stolen

before

they

may

inspect the V!N.
Finally,
decisions

in

N.Y.

Ct.

New York

had

App.

noted

construed

that

some

section

401

lower
of

the

Vehicle and Traffic Law as authorizing VlN inspections.
App.

rejected those decisions.

demand

inspection of

the

court
state

N.Y. Ct.

Section 401 authorized police to

VlN.

lt did

not

authorize police

to

intrude into a car without the driver's consent.

------

Two judges dissented.

Once a car is on the highway, its

owner has no expectation of privacy in the VlN.
the

VlN

is

to proclaim the

identity of

The purpose of

the vehicle,

a purpos

that is inconsistent with the owner's privacy interests.
other

hand,

the

identification
should

have

inspection

police

of
no

was

have

a

compelling

motor 'vehicles.
application

only

to

where

identify

interest

Concepts
the
the

of

purpose
vehicle,

in positiv

probable
of
not

the
to

cause
police
seize

physical evidence in connection with suspected criminal activity.

The

jug

dt ' s : n: ing

justified

in

making

inspect the VlN.

wo: ld
a

hold _that,

traffic

stop,

where
they

are

the

police

authorized

are
to

6.

Discussion
1.

Adequate and Independent State Grounds
Before reaching the merits of this case, the Court must

consider resp's threshold argument that the decision of N.Y. Ct.
App. rests on "adequate and independent state grounds."
it

seems

likely

that

the

Court

considered

and

Because

rejected

this

contention at the time it decided to grant cert., my discussion
of

this

point

determine

if

independent

will

a

be

state

brief.

court

state

grounds"

Long,

the

is

The

decision

vMichigan

leading
rests
v.

case
on

on

how

"adequate

Long,

463

u.s.

to
and

1032

(1983).
In

Court

stated

that,

when

"a

state

court

decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to
be

interwoven

with

federal

law,

and

when

the

adequacy

and

independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from
the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable
explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so."
at 1040-41.

Of course,

!d.

if a state decision clearly states that

it is "alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent grounds," the Court will not undertake to review it.
The Court adopted this approach in order to obviate the necessity
to examine state law to decide the nature of the state decision
and to avoid the intrusive practice of requiring state courts to
clarify the grounds for

their decisions.

In short, my reading

of Long is that the adequacy and independence of the state ground
must be "plain" on the face of the state decision.

In Long, the

7.

Court concluded

that

the

state decision did not rest on state

grounds; apart from two citations to the state constitution, the
decision relied exclusively on federal law.
In
violated
court,

this

the

case,

federal

unlike

the

N.Y.
and

Ct.

App.

state

state

court

stated

that

Long,

decisions to support its conclusion.

did

search

Moreover,

constitutions.
in

the

cite

some

the

state

But the decision discusses

only the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution, using the
reasonable

expectation

of

privacy

analysis

developed

in

the

federal case law.

Thus, while I do not think that it is as clear

in

it was

this case,

as

in Long,

decision primarily on federal law,
is

"interwoven"

statement"

with

that

it

federal

rests

on

that

the

state court rested

the state decision certainly

law

and

adequate

contains
and

no

"plain

independent

state

grounds.
In his brief, resp gives an analysis of the state cases
cited by N.Y. Ct. App.
on

adequate

and

in order to show that its decision rests

independent

grounds.

But

my

reading

of

Long

suggests that this sort of inquiry into state law is precisely
what

Long

was

designed

to

avoid.

Instead,

the

adequacy

and

independence of the state grounds must be reflected on "the face
of the opinion."
II.

463

u.s.

1040-41.

The Merits
I believe that the appropriate resolution of this case

depends largely on two decisions of thi~urt.
demonstrate

that

th~er's

conduct

does

l/~

These decisions ~
implicate

Fourth~

Amendment concerns and that, therefore, it is necessary to apply

lAM }.I
~C.II..- ~

8.

to

this

case

developed
the

Fourth

Amendment

principles

as

in the context of motor vehicles.

recent

decisions,

I

will

discuss

they

have

been

Before turning

the

governing

to

Fourth

Amendment principles as applied to automobiles.

-------------------------~

The Fourth Amendment protects "the privacy and security
of

individuals

against

arbitrary

invasions

officials."

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

(Powell,

concurring) •

J. ,

in

As

every

by

u.s.

government

364, 377 (1976)

Fourth

Amendment

case,

resolution of the question presented here "requires a weighing of
the governmental and societal interests advanced to justify such
intrusions against the constitutionally protected interest of the
individual citizen in the privacy of his effects."

Id.

at 378.

The Court has recognized that individuals do have an expectation
of

privacy

in

their

"limited."

Two

conclusion

that

automobiles,

factors
a

have

person's

but

been

that

such expectation

identified

expectation

of

to

justify

privacy

in

is
the
his

automobile is entitled to less protection than such expectation ~
in, for example, his home.
First,
and

continuing

periodic
v.

unlike homes,

governmental

occurrence,

428

u.s.

at

"are subjected to pervasive

regulation

inspection and licensing

Opperman,

traffic,

cars,

368.

and

controls,

requirements."
Thus,

as

a

including

routine,

or safety i_I)fractions.

expectation of priv-t1cy with

~

South Dakota

"police stop and examine" vehicles when they

registration,

Id.

respect to automobiles

ever:;J'/;'-'~
obser ~

Second,
is

the

"further

diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel."
Id.

Moreover,

the

Court

has

pointed

out

that

~

expectation of

9.

privacy

in

the

because

that

California

passenger

compartment

v.

Carney,

compartment
is

of

"relatively

105

S.Ct.

a

car

open

2066,

is

to

2069

diminished

plain

view."

(1985).

This

diminished expectation of privacy, combined with the mobility of
automobiles,

led

exception"

the

to

the

Court

warrant

to

recognize

requirement of

"automobile

the

the Fourth Amendment.

~J-~

Id.
Under
if

decide

public

pri~ therefore,
inspectio~at occurred in this

the

the

"reasonable."

governing

VIN

interest

in

law enforcement

~'

are important.
traffic
which

and
is

proper.

safety

against

case

was

subject

~'
with

governmental

the

the

regulation

resp' s

interest

in

Two facts in this case

to

Therefore,
Fourth

See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434

connection

must

the police had properly stopped resp for

infractions.

clearly

curiam).

you

Reasonableness, in turn, requires you to weigh the

being free of governmental intrusion.

further

the

Amendment

u.s.

which

of

vehicles

is

stop,

scrutiny,

was

106, 109 (1977)

intrusion

VIN,

initial

was

part

conducted

of

that has

(per

the

led

the

in

pervasive
Court

to

recognize a diminished expectation of privacy in motor vehicles.
With these facts
of

~

this

Court

in mind,
that

I will briefly describe two decisions

-

suggest

------------------

reasonable.

In Deleware v.

Prouse,

the

that

440

u.s.

inspection

VIN

650

(1979),

-

was

the Court

held that, "except in those situations in which there is at least
and

articulable
unlicensed

or

reasonable

that

an

suspicion

automobile

is

not

that

a

motorist

registered,

or

is
that

10.

either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure
for violation of law,
driver

in

order

stopping an automobile and detaining

to

check

his

driver's

license

and

the
the

registration of the automobile are unreasonable under . the Fourth
Amendment."

Id.

at 663

(emphasis added).

In other words,

the

police do not have unbridled discretion to select cars at random
for

inspection

of

license

and

But,

registration.

under

my

reading of the case,

police may check license and registration

documents

have

when

they

stopped

a

vehicle

for

a

traffic

violation even in the absence of suspicion that the driver lacks
such documents.

As the Court stated, "Vehicle stops for traffic

violations

occur

countless

occasions,

licenses

and

times

each

registration

day;

papers

and
are

on

these

subject

inspection and drivers without them will be ascertained."

to (P~

Id. at

The Court did observe that "drivers without licenses" will
659.--------------------~-----------------------------------probably be
they

are

concern

stopped more often for

presumably
was

that

"the

police

traffic

infractions because

less · safe drivers."
discretion

in

But

deciding

the Court's

whom

to

stop

should not be unbridled in light of the substantial intrusion of
the stop on individual rights.

__

In this case,
.__

___...

the officers' discretion with respect to

their initial decision to stop resp's car was properly exercised.
That is, they stopped resp, not on a random hunch, but because he
I have no doubt

was engaged in traffic and safety infractions.
that the officers were then,
to inspect
inspect

re~p's

under Delaware v.

Prouse, entitled

license and registration papers.

those- papers,

it

is

difficult

to

If they could

understand

why

they

~

11.

could

not

also

regi-stration,
motor

inspect

the

vehicles

~

enforcing.
between

I

VIN

is

a

unable

inspection

Like

VIN.

part

of

the

the

license

regula tory

and
for ~

scheme

~-----------------~------police have a
legitimate
interest

that
am

the

of

to

discern

license

a

and

meaningful

registration

in

distinction
papers

and

inspection of a VIN except for the fact that VIN inspection does
involve an additional

'!'hat

intrusion.

is,

police must peer through the windshield,
or

open

the

hood

and examine

~nsylvania

reasoning

in

curiam) ,

suggests

434

Mimms,

such

the VIN,

inspect the door jamb,

the engine.

v.

that

to inspect

believe

I

that

the

u.s.

106

( 1977)

is

not

necessarily

intrusion

(per (2~C:.

unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
In Pennsylvania v.
defendant

driving

a

car

Mimms,

with

an

two police officers observed
expired

license

officers stopped the car to issue a traffic summons.
approached

and

produce his

asked

defendant

to

get

out

license and registration.

of

revolver.

'!'he

An officer
car

and

to

When defendant complied,

the officer noticed a bulge beneath his jacket.
bulge might be a gun,

his

plate.

Fearing that the

the officer frisked defendant and found a

'!'he portion of the Court's reasoning that I believe is

most relevant to this case relates

to the officer's order that

defendant get out of his car.
First,

the

questions concerning
on

[defendant's]

Court

observed

the propriety of

freedom

of

that

the

case

raised

no

"the initial rest:r..-ictions

movement."

'!'he

officers

properly

stopped him for an infraction of the state's motor vehicle code.
Second,

the Court considered the question of whether "the order

12.

to

get

out

detained,

of

was

Amendment."

the

car,

issued

reasonable
!d.

and

after

the

driver

was

thus permissible under

lawfully

the Fourth

The Court focused "on the incremental

at 109.

intrusion resulting from the request to get out of the car once
the vehicle was lawfully stopped."
the practice of ordering
even

though

he

dangerous.

had

no

!d.

all drivers
reason

to

The dfficer had adopted

to get out of

believe

that

the

their cars
driver

He did this as a precautionary measure to reduce the

possibility that the driver could make unobserved movements.
Court

was

concluded

that

this

"legitimate and weighty."

safety

justification

was

The
both

On the other side of the balance, the

Court weighed the intrusion occasioned by the order to get out of
the car
the

and

that this

concluded

intrusion

caused

by

the

"additional intrusion,"

lawful

stop,

was

"de

beyond

minimis."

Asking the driver to get out of his car and expose to view little
more than would be exposed if he remained in the car was at "most
a

when

inconvenience"

mere

legitimate

safety

concerns.

upon observing the bulge,

balanced
Finally,

against

the

Court

the

state's

decided

that,

the officer was entitled to frisk the

defendant.
In
intrusion,

___......

the

VIN

consists

this

case,

one

must

focus

on

the

incremental

beyond that occasioned by the lawful stop, caused by

inspection.
of

the

The

officer's

incremental
action

intrusion

in

opening

in
the

this
car

case
door,

inspecting the door jamb for the VIN, and then reaching into the
car

to move

papers

on

the dashboard

to reveal

the

VIN plate.

While the nature of the intrusion in this case is different from

J

13.

that involved in Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

I tend to think that the

intrusion is reasonable.
First,
in

it is necessary to consider the public interest

law enforcement

served

by

VIN

inspection.

j

~

Based on petr's

discussion of the function of the VIN, which resp does not appear

~~~
t'1n
1n~eres

.
.
..
to d1spute,
1t
seems that the State h as a 1 eg1t1mate

permitting police to view the VIN.

Unless police do so, they are

not certain that registration or

insurance documents accurately

reflect the status of the vehicle.

Moreover, stolen cars do pose

a ~em,

to ascertain

if

a

and inspection of the VIN permits the police

vehicle

involved

in a

traffic violation has

been stolen.
Second,
individual
clearly

it

is

against

has

an

necessary

to weigh

State's

interest.

the

expectation

of

the

interest of

Though

privacy

in

the

his

the

driver

car,

that

--------------~

expectation

is

limited.

Significantly,

the

driver

does

appear to have any expectation of privacy in the VIN itself.

VIN is placed on the car to identify it;
regulatory

scheme

depends

on

official

not
The

implementation of the

inspection

of

the

VIN.

While inspection of the VIN may in some cases (such as where the
police

must

inspect

the

door

jamb)

would not otherwise be exposed,

expose

known

to

intrusion
view,

...

will

the

approved

be

VIN

affixed
be

only

view

inspection~he

require a full-blown search of the car.
is

to

in

to

those

inspection

is

less

in Pennsylvania v. Mimms.

that

VIN does not

Rather, because the VIN

particular

limited

areas

locations.
intrusive

locations,
Finally,
than

the

police
in my
conduct

My own feeling as a driver

\

l

1/a.- I

14.

is that an official order to get out of my car is more intrusive
than an order to open the car door to permit VIN inspection.
I believe that the balance in this case tips in favor of
the State interest in inspecting the VIN.

I feel a bit hesitant

about this conclusion because I treasure the interests secured by
the Fourth Amendment.

But,

in light of Deleware v.

Prouse and

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, my balancing of the interests leads me to
conclude that police may, upon a lawful stop of a motor vehicle
for traffic violations, inspect the VIN.
The
In

issue.

CAs
my

have

view,

reached
none

of

~nfli~ecis~
the

decisions

satisfactory framework of analysis.

provides

on
a

this
wholly

Some of the CAs have ruled

that inspection of the VIN is not a "search" within the meaning 1)'2..cfof the Fourth Amendment.
729 F.2d
446,

1418

454-55

it suggests
concerns.
suggests
selecting

@

See, e.g.,

1984);

~ 980).
that VIN
A holding

that

vehicles

---------......

States v.

Forrest,

620

inspection implicates no Fourth Amendment
a

are

for

VIN

no

VIN

inspection

limits

on

inspection.

is

not

police
As

I

a

"search"

discretion

in

discuss above,

I

believe that the Fourth Amendment does restrict police authority
to inspect VINs.
inspection

is

Moreover, many of the cases holding that a VIN

not

a

search

also

state

that,

even

if

the

inspection was a search, the search was reasonable for the facts
of the case gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the car was
stolen or being used
States

...

v.

Forrest,

for
supra;

criminal activity.
United

States

v.

See ,

e.g • ,

Duckett,

United

583

~

F.2d)~

That conclusion is not satisfactory for

that

there

United

United States v. Kitowski :?

F.2d

15.

1309,

1313

useful

(CAS

analysis

stopped

a

car

Thus,

1978).
in

for

a

case

a

these

where

traffic

decisions

the

do not

officers

have

provide
properly

infraction but lack any basis to

believe that the car was stolen.
the

On

warrantless
Fourth
(CAl 0

other

hand,

a

decision

intrusion into a car

Amendment.
1965) •

See

Where

pol ice

CAlO

holds

that

a

to inspect a VIN violated the

Simpson v.

the

of

United

seek

to

States,
inspect

346

F.2d

the

291

VIN of

a

vehicle not otherwise subject to seizure, they should be required
to

justify their

action on the basis of at least a

reasonable

suspicion that the vehicle is stolen or being used for criminal
activity.

But,

in this case, resp's car was subject to seizure

for traffic violations.

At that point, the question becomes for

me the extent to which the additional intrusion occasioned by VIN
inspection can be said to outweigh the police interest in such
inspection.
While

it does not rest on the precise facts presented

-

here, the most persuasive CA decision
on VIN inspection is United f.1~t
,.........._,_._
~

States v.

Powers,

439

F.2d 374 @

1971).

In that case,

CA4 ~

held that "when there is a legitimate reason to identify a motor
vehicle,

inspection

unreasonable

search."

of

its
CA4

confidential

decided

that

number
a

VIN

is

not

an

inspection

is

subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment.

But the

court noted that the mobility of cars makes them attractive to
criminals:

cars

are

instruments of crime.

frequently

stolen

and

are

often

used

as

Police have an interest in checking the

VIN expeditiously before a car is moved.

Though a person has an

--

16.

expectation of privacy in his vehicle, he has no expectation of
privacy

in

identification

of

the

vehicle.

search of

that

but a minimal invasion

part of the vehicle displaying the VIN
of a person's privacy ...

And

Accordingly,

olice should be freer to

inspect the VIN than they are to searc

for private property.

On

the facts of the case before it, CA4 concluded that police had a
legitimate reason to search for the confidential VIN because they
noticed that the public VIN was missing from the doorpost.

CA4

declined to say what other circumstances would supply police with
a legitimate reason to inspect a VIN.

In my view, this reasoning

is sound and can be extended to the facts of this case.
police properly had

stopped

resp for

a

Here,

traffic violation;

they

had a legitimate interest in identifying the vehicle involved in
the violation;

intrusion for

the purpose of locating the VIN is

limited.
While I believe that the above discussion resolves the
issue

raised

in

this

case,

I

would like to make the

following

______.,

additional points.
(1}

Though petr New York State agrees that police could

not arbitrarily select vehicles for a VIN inspection, petr relies
on the CA cases holding
within

the meaning

of

that a

VIN

inspection is not a

search

Petr emphasizes

the Fourth Amerldment.

the driver's lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
VIN, but ignores the fact that a driver does have an expectation
of privacy m----his car, -which is the
;

intrude
argument

... :t·

in

orde...r;..
should

to
be

inspect
rejected

the

are a into which police must

VIN.

for

it

As

I

note

suggests

above,
that

this

police

17.

inspection

of

whatsoever.

the

VIN

implicates

no

Fourth

This point may be more

Amendment

semantic

than

concerns

real,

but

I

believe that a holding that VIN inspection is not a "search" for
Fourth

Amendment purposes could

lead

to doctrinal

incoherence.

Rather, the Court should hold that VIN inspection is an intrusion
subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions and then engage in the
traditional

balancing of

interests outlined

in

Pennsylvania v.

Mimms.
(2) Petr argues that the inspection was justified on the
ground

that

resp

had

no driver's

The argument boils

license.

down to the assertion that, because he was unlicensed,

resp had

virtually no expectation of privacy in the passenger compartment
of

the

car.

Petr's

contentions

entirely unconvincing.

in

this

connection

are

not

For example, petr points out that police

must prevent the unlicensed driver from continuing to operate the
vehicle and must impound the vehicle.

These steps will require

the police to intrude into the interior of the car.
agree with my balancing

of

interests,

you need

But if you

not reach this

argument. On this record, it would be better not to do so for two
reasons.

First, adoption of the argument might be impeded by a

factual problem.
the

VIN was

license.

Resp points out that the officer who inspected

not aware at the

Accordingly,

the

time he did so that resp had no

Court

would

have

to

impute

the

knowledge of the officer who requested license and registration
to the officer who
argument

.,

would

inspected

lead

to

a

the VIN.
holding

Second,

broader

adoption of the

than

necessary

to

j

18.

resolve the issue in this case.

This argument was not raised in

N.Y. Ct . App.
(3)

Petr

invites

open in Michigan v.

the Court

Long,

463

u.s.

to decide
1032

a

question

(1983).

left

In that case,

the Court held that police could search the passenger compartment
of a car for weapons "as long as they possess an articulable and
objectively

reasonable

dangerous."

Id.

at

belief

1051.

that

the

suspect

The Court noted

is

that,

potentially
in Long,

the

police could have arrested defendant for speeding or for driving
while

intoxicated,

but that they did not do so.

The Court did

not answer the question whether, where probable cause to arrest
exists,

"but

the

officers do not

actually

effect

the

arrest,"

they may nevertheless conduct a search as broad as that permitted
incident

to

an

arrest.

points out that

Id.

at

1035 n.l.

In

this case,

the officers had probable cause to arrest resp

for traffic violations at the time of the VIN inspection.
view,

See

In my

the Court need not reach the question reserved in Long in

order to uphold the VIN inspection.
more

petr

1 imi ted
New

York

than
v.

that permit ted
Belton,

453

The VIN inspection is much

incident

u.s.

454

to a

(1981)

lawful
(where

arrest.
police

arrested driver of car based on probable cause to believe that
driver possessed marijuana, police were entitled to search entire
passenger compartment) •
broader

authority

to

I

see no reason to give the police far

search

intrusion that occur red
argument in N.Y. Ct. App.

than

that

in this case.

needed

to

permit

the

Petr did not raise this

19.

(4)
involved

in

While I believe that my balancing of the interests
this

case

is

appropriate,

resp's arguments have force.
inspect the VIN,

I

must acknowledge

that

Resp argues that, before police may

they must have an objectively reasonable basis

to believe that the car is stolen.

By opening the car door, the

officer did expose to view otherwise hidden areas in which resp
had

an

expectation

of

privacy.

The

fact

that

resp

had

no

expectation of privacy in the VIN itself is irrelevant for he had
such an expectation in the car.

Though the Court has discarded

the warrant requirement with respect to automobile searches, the
Court has always held that intrusion into the interior of a car
must be

1

justified on the basis of probable cause or reasonable

suspicion.

Resp

distinguishable.

claims
In Mimms,

that

Pennsylvania

v.

Mimms

is

the officer's order to the driver to

get out of the car 'meant only that the driver would be detained
outside

the

involve any

car

rather

than

search as did

inside

this case.

the

car.

Mimms

did

not

Resp also contends that

police could use less intrusive means to inspect the VIN, such as
securing the driver's consent.

Indeed, as N.Y. Ct. App. noted,

New York law permits an officer to demand exhibition of the VIN.
If the officer had done so here, resp would have complied, and no
intrusion would have occurred.

Moreover, through a check of the

car's license plates, the police will often be able to determine
that a car is stolen.
be governed

by

the

Resp also believes that this case should

reasoning of Michigan v.

Long

in which

the

Court held that the police may search a vehicle for weapons only

20.

if they have reasonable suspicion that the driver is potentially
dangerous.
1 think that resp's arguments are not unreasonable and
that

you

driver's

could

dec ide

to

strike

the

balance

in

favor

of

interest in being free of governmental intrusion.

the
But

resp's arguments fail to take account of the fact that police are
authorized,

on a

valid

stop for

traffic violations,

to

inspect

other documents and that a VIN inspection would not allow police
to rummage
resp

through

gives

very

the entire passenger compartment.
little

weight

to

the

public

Moreover,

interest

in

permitting police to determine if a vehicle is in compliance with
the VIN regulatory scheme.
(5)

___

Finally,

oral argument

one

question
__.....

that

is what police may do if

exhibit his license and registration,
that

the

driver

may

not

withhold

might

be

answered

at

they order a driver

to

and he refuses.

his

consent.

Then,

police search the driver or the car for those documents?
they arrest the driver?
demand

exhibition~_ of

If not,

are

the

would be

less

can

the

Or must

Similarly, if the police are entitled to

the VIN,

may

the driver withhold consent?

pol ice entitled to look

they arrest the driver?

1 assume

for

It seems to me that,

intrusive for

the VIN,

or must

in many cases,

the officer simply to look for

it
the

VIN on the spot rather than arrest the driver.
Conclusion
VIN inspection does implicate Fourth Amendment concerns
for it requires police intrusion into a vehicle, an area in which
citizens have an expectation of privacy.

~

,'

Accordingly, police are

not entitled arbitrarily to select vehicles for VIN inspections.
But, where police lawfully have detained a vehicle for a traffic

~~----------------------violation
or on reasonable
suspicion that the vehicle is involved
,_
____..

in criminal activity,
inspect the VIN.

I

I believe that they should be entitled to
reach this result upon balancing the strong

----~

law enforcement interest in permitting the police to enforce the
VIN regulatory scheme against the limited intrusion on individual
interests caused by the VIN inspection •

•J ..t
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
~ c:Jjl .

No. 84-1181
NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. BENIGNO CLASS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK
[December -

, 1985]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
1./L ~
In this case, we must decide whether, in order to observe a _
~
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible from
outside an automobile, a police officer may reach into the pas- ~ ~
senger compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring ~ ~
the VIN after its driver has been stopped for a traffic violation and has exited the car. We hold that, in these circum- ~ 6
stances, the police officer's action does not violate the Fourth /1 ~ _,~ ./ T'
Amendment.
"~~ ~
I
On the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City police
1
officers Lawrence Meyer and William MeN amee observed re- w£J- S D ~
spondent Benigno Class driving above the speed limit in a car
with a cracked windshield. Both driving with a cracked ~~
windshield and speeding are traffic violations under New ~ft._ A York law. See N. Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law §§375(22),
1180(d) (McKinney 1970). Respondent followed the officers'
ensuing directive to pull over. Respondent then emerged
from his car and approached Officer Meyer.
Officer
McNamee went directly to respondent's vehicle. Respondent provided Officer Meyer with a registration certificate and
proof of insurance, but stated that he had no driver's license.
Meanwhile, Officer MeN amee opened the door of respondent's car to look for the Vehicle Inspection Number (VIN),
which is located on the left door jamb in automobiles manufactured before 1969. When the officer did not find the VIN

~~

vz- ~

b'f/t-4-bv~
c:!~CtA-

1.-0

t

~//IN~
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on the door jamb, he reached into the interior of respondent's
car to move some papers obscuring the area of the dashboard
where the VIN is located in all post-1969 models. In doing
so, Officer McNamee saw the handle of a gun protruding
about one inch from underneath the driver's seat. The officer seized the gun, and respondent was promptly arrested.
Respondent was also issued summonses for his traffic
violations.
It is undisputed that the police officers had no reason to
suspect that respondent's car was stolen, that it contained
contraband, or that respondent had committed an offense
other than the traffic violations. Nor is it disputed that respondent committed the traffic violations with which he was
charged, and that, as of the day of the arrest, he had not been
issued a valid driver's license.
After the state trial court denied a motion to suppress the
gun as evidence, respondent was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. See N. Y. Penal
Law § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). The Supreme Court for
Bronx County upheld the conviction without opinion. The
New York Court of Appeals reversed. It reasoned that the
police officer's "intrusion . . . was undertaken to obtain
information and it exposed . . . hidden areas" of the car, and
"therefore constituted a search." . People v. Class, 63
.N. Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N. E . 2d 1009, 1011 (1984). Although
it recognized that a search for a VIN generally involves a
minimal intrusion because of its limite<L.Eot~ti~jions,
and~ there is a compelling law-en£
'nterest in positively identifying ven1c es involved in accidents or
auto thefts, the court thought it decisive that the facts of this
case "reveal no reason for the officer to suspect other criminal activity [besides the traffic infraction] or to act to protect
his own safety." !d., at 495-496. The state statutory provision that authorizes officers to demand that drivers reveal
their VIN "provided no justification for the officer's entry of
[respondent's] car." ld., at 497. If the officer had taken

84-1181-0PINION
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advantage of that statute and asked to see the VIN, respondent could have moved the papers away himself and no intrusion would have occurred. In the absence of any justification for the search besides the traffic infraction, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that the gun must be excluded
from evidence.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and now
reverse.
II
Respondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction
to hear this case because the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals rests on an adequate and independent state
ground. We disagree.
The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals mentions
the New York Constitution but once, and then only in direct
conjunction with the United States Constitution. 63
N. Y.2d, at 493, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1010. Cf. Michigan v.
Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1043 (1983). The opinion below makes
use of both federal and New York cases in its analysis, generally citing both for the same proposition. See, e. g., 63
N. Y.2d, at 494, 495, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1011. The opinion
lacks the requisite "plain statement" that it rests on state
grounds. Michigan v. Long, supra, at 1042, 1044. Accordingly, our holding in Michigan v. Long is directly applicable
here:
"[W]hen . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the
federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of
the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it
did because it believed that federal law required it to do
so." ld., at 1040-1041.
See also California v. Carney,-- U. S . - - , - - n. 1
(1985).

I
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Respondent's claim that the opinion below rested on independent and adequate state statutory grounds is also without
merit. The New York Court of Appeals did not hold that
§ 401 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibited the
search at issue here, but, in rejecting an assertion of the petitioner, merely held that § 401 "provided no justification" for
a search. 63 N. Y.2d, at 497, 472 N. E . 2d, at 1013 (emphasis added). In determining that the police officer's action
was prohibited, the court below looked to the Federal Constitution, not the State's statute. Moreover, New York adheres to the general rule that, when statutory construction
can resolve a case, courts should not decide constitutional
issues. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U. S. 288, 346-347 (Brandeis, J., concurring); In re Peters v.
New York City Housing Authority, 307 N. Y. 519, 527, 121
N. E. 2d 529, 531 (1954). Since the New York Court of Appeals discussed both statutory and constitutional grounds, we
may infer that the court believed the statutory issue insufficient to resolve the case. The discussion of the statute
therefore could not have constituted an independent and adequate state ground.
III
A
The officer here, after observing respondent commit two
traffic violations and exit the car, attempted to determine the
VIN of respondent's automobile. In reaching to remove papers obscuring the VIN, the officer intruded into the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
The VIN consists of more than a dozen digits, unique to
each vehicle and required on all cars and trucks. See 49
CFR § 571.115 (1984). The VIN is roughly analogous to a
serial number, but it can be deciphered to reveal not only the
place of the automobile in the manufacturer's production run,
but the make, model, engine type, and place of manufacture
of the vehicle. See id., § 565.4.

I
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The VIN is a significant thread in the web of regulation of
the automobile. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 2189 (1978).
The ease with which the VIN allows identification of a particular vehicle assists the various levels of government in
many ways. For the federal government, the VIN improves
the efficacy of recall campaigns, and assists researchers in
determining the risks of driving various makes and models of
automobiles. In combination with state insurance laws, the
VIN reduces the number of those injured in accidents who go
uncompensated for lack of insurance. In conjunction with
the state's registration requirements and safety inspections,
the VIN helps to ensure that automobile operators are driving safe vehicles. By making auto theft more difficult, the
VIN safeguards not only property but life and limb. See 33
Fed. Reg. 10,207 (1968) (noting that stolen vehicles are
disproportionately likely to be involved in automobile
accidents).
To facilitate the VIN's usefulness for these laudable governmental purposes,' federal law requi '' that the VIN be
placed in the plain view o someon outst e e a omo 1 e:
"The VIN for passenger cars [man actured after 1969]
shall be located inside the passenger compartment. It
shall be readable, without moving any part of the vehicle, through the vehicle glazing under daylight lighting
conditions by an observer having 20/20 vision (Snellen)
whose eye point is located outside the vehicle adjacent to
the left windshield pillar. ~ter in the VIN
subject to this paragraph shall have a minimum height
of 4 mm." 49 CFR § 571.115 (S 4.6) (1984) (emphasis
added).
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658 (1979), we recognized the "vital interest" in highway safety and the various
programs that contribute to that interest. In light of the important interests served by the VIN, the federal and state
governments are amply justified in making it a part of the
web of pervasive regulation that surrounds the automobile,

84-1181-0PINION
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and in requiring its placement in an area ordinarily in plain
view from outside the passenger compartment.
B

A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the
Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 663; Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 (1973). Nonetheless, the state's
intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or
elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation
unless the area is one in which there is a "constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, - - (1984);
Maryland v. Macon,-- U.S.--, at-- (1985).
The Court has recognized that the physical characteristics
of an automobile and its use result in a lessened expectation
of privacy therein:
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its
occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
Moreover, automobiles are justifiably the subject of pervasi~ :r_eg:uJatioJl-12yJhJLstate. Every operat~
hiclelilusteXpecrthat1He state, in enforcing its regulations,
will intrude to some extent upon that operator's privacy:
"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subject to pervasive
and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements.
As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety
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equipment are not in proper working order." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976).
See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1973);
California v. Carney, supra, at--.
The factors that generally diminish the reasonable expectation of privacy in automobiles are applicable a fortiori to the
VIN. As we have discussed above, the VIN plays an important part in the pervasive regulation by the government of
the automobile. A motorist must surely expect that such
regulation will on occasion require the State to determine the
VIN of his or her vehicle, and the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished.
This is especially true in the case of a driver who has committed a traffic violation. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at
659 ("The foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle
safety regulations . . . is acting upon observed violations.
Vehicle stops for traffic violations occur countless times each
day; and on these occasions, license and registration papers
are subject to inspection and drivers without them will be ascertained.") (emphasis added). In addition, it is unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an object required
by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from
the exterior of the automobile. The YIN's mandated visibility makes it more similar to the exterior of the car than to the
trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of a car, of
course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it
does not constitute a "search." See Cardwell v. Lewis,
supra, at 588-589. In sum, because of the important role
played by the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation
of the automobile and the efforts by the federal government
to ensure that the VIN is placed in plain view, we hold that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN.
We think it makes no difference that the papers in respond-;
ent's car obscured the VIN from th~fficer.
We a e ecen y emphasized t a ef o s to restrict access
to an area do not enerate a reaso~ri-
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vacy where none would otherwise exist. / See Oliver v.
United StateS; supra, at-- (placement of "No Trespassing"
signs on secluded property does not create "legitimate privacy interest" in marijuana fields). Here, where the object
at issue is an identification number behind the transparent
windshield of an automobile driven upon the public roads, we
believe that the placement of the obscuring papers was insufficient to create a privacy interest in the VIN. The mere
viewing of the formerly obscured VIN was not, therefore, a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

c
The evidence that respondent sought to have suppressed
was not the VIN, however, b~, the handle of which
the officer saw from the interior of the car while reaching for
the papers that covered the VIN. While the interior of an
automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy
that exist with respect to one's home, a car's interior as a
whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police. We agree
with the New York Court of Appeals that the intrusion into
that space constituted a "search." 63 N. ~72
N. E. ~ware v. Prouse, supra, at 653
("stoppin an automobile and d a
"ts c
nstitute a seizure' . . . even though the purpose of the stop is
lim1 e an the resulting detention quite brief"). We must
decide, therefore, whether this search was constitutionally
permissible.
If respondent had remained in the car, the police would
have been justified in asking him to move the papers obscuring the VIN. New York law authorizes a demand by officers
to see the VIN, see 63 N. Y.2d, at 496-497, 472 N. E. 2d, at
1012-1013, and even if the state law were not explicit on this
point we have no difficulty in concluding that a demand to inspect the VIN, like a demand to see license and registration
papers, is within the scope of police authority pursuant to a
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traffic violation stop. See Prouse, supra, at 659. If respondent had stayed in his vehicle and acceded to such a
request from the officer, the officer would not have needed
to intrude into the passenger compartment. Respondent
chose, however, to exit the vehicle without removing the papers that covered the VIN; the officer chose to conduct his
search without asking respondent to return to the car. We
must therefore decide whether the fficer acted within the
boun s of t e Fourth Amendment in condUCtfn ~ch.
We hol t at he 1d.
~er of a vehicle in the car during a routine
traffic stop is probably the typical police practice. See D.
Schultz and D. Hunt, Traffic Investigation and Enforcement
17 (1983). Nonetheless, out of a concern for the safety of the
police, the Court has held that officers may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, exercise their discretion to require a
driver who commits a traffic violation to exit the vehicle.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
While we impute to respondent no propensity for violence,
and while we ·are conscious of the fact that respondent here
voluntarily left the vehicle, the facts of this case may be used
to illustrate one of the principal justifications for the discretion given police officers by Pennsylvania v. Mimms: while
in the driver's seat, respondent had a loaded pistol at hand.
Mimms allows an officer to guard against that possibility by
requiring the driver to exit the car briefly. Clearly, Mimms
also allowed the officers here to detain respondent briefly
outside the car that he voluntarily exited while they completed their investigation.
The question remains, however, as to whether the officers (
could not only effect the seizure of respondent necessary to
detain him briefly outside the vehicle, but also effect a search
for the VIN that may have been necessary only because of
that detention. The pistol beneath the seat did not, of
course, disappear when respondent closed the car door behind him. To have returned respondent immediately to the

'

. ..

~
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automobile would have placed the officers in the same situation that the holding in Mimms allows officers to avoid-permitting an individual being detained to have possible access
to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial concealment provided by the car's exterior. See Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, supra, at 110. In light of the danger to the officers'
safety that would have been presented by returning respondent immediately to his car, we think the search to obtain the
VIN was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment by its terms prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures. We have noted that
"there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523,
534-535, 536-537 (1967). And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
.rational inferences from those facts, justifiably warrant
that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)
(footnote omitted) (brackets as in Terry).
This test generally means that searches must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant backed by probable cause. See
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 105-109 (1965);
United States v. Karo, - - U.S. - - , at - - (1984).
When a search or seizure has as its immediate object a search
for a weapon, however, we have struck the balance to allow
the weighty interest in the safety of police officers to justify
warrantless searches based only on a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. See TerFi/v. ·-vHro, 392lJ.8.i(1968);
Adams v. tlliams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972). Such searches
are permissible despite their substantial intrusiveness. See
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 24-25 (search was "a severe, though
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and . . .
must surely [have] b[een] an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience").

I

I
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When the officer's safety is less directly served by the detention, something more than objectively justifiable suspicion
is necessary to justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip in
favor of the legality of the governmental intrusion. In
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 107, the officers had personally observed the seized individual in the commission of a
traffic offense before requesting that he exit his vehicle. In
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 693 (1981), the officers
had obtained a warrant to search the house that the person
seized was leaving when they came upon him. While the
facts in Pennsylvania v. Mimms and Michigan v. Summers
differ in some respects from the facts of this case, the similarities are strong enough that the balancing of governmental
interests against governmental intrusion undertaken in those
cases is also appropriate here. All three of the factors involved in Mimms and Summers ar'e present iilihfs case: the
U/saf~ of the officers was served by);~ governmental intrusiQnf2-the intrusion was minimal; an<P'the search stemmed
from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual
affected by the sea~. Indeed, here the officer's probable
cause stemmed from directly observing respondent commit a
violation of the law.
When we undertake the necessary balancing of "the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion," United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983), the conclusion that
the search here was permissible follows. As we recognized
in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 658, the governmental interest in highway safety served by obtaining the VIN is of
the first order, and the particular method of obtaining the
VIN here was justified by a concern for the officer's safety.
The "critical" issue of the intrusiveness of the government's
action, United States v. Place, supra, at 722 (BLACKMUN, J.,
concurring in the judgment), also here weighs in favor of allowing the search. The search was focused in its objective

)
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and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective.
The search was far less intrusive than a formal arrest, which
would have been permissible for a traffic offense under N€w
York law, seeN. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155 (McKinney 1970 & 1984-1985 Pocket Part); id., Criminal Procedure
Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and little more intrusive than a demand that the respondent-under the eyes of the officersmove the papers himself. The VIN, which was the clear initial objective of the officer, is by law present in one of two
locations-either inside the door jamb, or atop the dashboard
and thus ordinarily in plain view of someone outside the automobile. Neither of those locations is subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The officer here checked both those
locations, and only those two locations. The officer did not
root about the interior of the respondent's automobile before
proceeding to examine the VIN. He did not reach into any
compartments or open any containers. He did not even intrude into the interior at all until after he had checked the
door jamb for the VIN. When he did intrude, the officer
simply reached directly for the unprotected space where the
VIN was located to move the offending papers. We hold
that this search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable exp€ctation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the officers observed respondent commit two traffic violations. Any other
conclusion would expose police officers to potentially grave
risks without significantly reducing the intrusiveness of the
ultimate conduct-viewing the VIN-which, as we have said,
the officers were entitled to do as part of an undoubtedly justified traffic stop.
We note that our holding today does not authorize police
officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a dashboard-mounted
VIN when the VIN is visible from outside the automobile.
If the VIN is in the plain view of someone outside the vehicle,
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there is no justification for governmental intrusion into the
passenger compartment to see it.*
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

*Petitioner invites us to hold that respondent's status as an unlicensed
driver deprived him of any reasonable expectations of privacy in the vehicle, because the officers would have been within their discretion to have
prohibited respondent from driving the car away, to have impounded the
car, and to have later conducted an inventory search thereof. Cf. South
Dakota v. Opperman, supra (police may conduct inventory search of car
impounded for multiple parking violations); Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431
(1984) (discussing the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary
rule). Petitioner also argues that there can be no Fourth Amendment violation here because the police could have arrested respondent, see N. Y.
Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155 (McKinney 1970 & 1984-1985 Pocket Part);
id., Criminal Procedure Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and could then have
searched the passenger compartment at the time of arrest, cf. New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), or arrested respondent and searched the car
after impounding it pursuant to the arrest, see Cady v. Dombrowski,
supra. We do not, however, reach those questions here.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
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I join the Court's opinion, but write

t-14-~ ·
~~ atg J y t-P s w.te

lv~1~~

m~

(that we~everse the judgment of the New York

Court of Appeals on the ground that, in light of the unique and
important governmental interests served by inspection of the
Vehicle Identification Number
~d

(VIN), the limited intrusion

by the officer in this case was not an unreasonable

search of respondent's automobile.

~

As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a serial

number that, by identifying certain features of the vehicle to
which it is affixed, provides an effective and reliable means for

#

2positive identification of the

vehicle.

Accordingly, the VIN

occupies a central position in the elaborate federal and state
regulation of automobiles,

H..,~t

~

1

frequently depend on such

positive identification.

direct manufacturers to place the VIN in a location where it
in the plain view of an observer standing outside the vehicle.
49 C.F.R. §571.115 S4.6 (1984).
When an officer lawfully has stopped a motor vehicle for
violation of traffic or other law, the officer is entitled to
I

inspect license and registration documents.
Prouse, 440
(1977)

u.s.

See Deleware v.

650 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434

(per curiam).

u.s.

106

Unquestionably, the officer also may look

through the windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without
implicating any Fourth Amendment concerns.

Resp does not

contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, that such action
violates the federal Constitution.

The question raised on the

facts of this case, therefore, is whether the Fourth Amendment

•. . ,

I

l

was offended by the "incremental intrusion" resulting from the
officer's efforts to observe the VIN once respondent's vehicle
lawfully was stopped.

Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 109.

The answer to this question may be simply stated.

Whether

the intrusion into respondent's vehicle offended the Fourth
Amendment "requires a weighing of the governmental and societal
interests advanced to justify" the intrusion "against the
constitutionally protected interest of the individual citizen in
the privacy of his effects."
364, 378 (1976)

(Powell, J., concurring).

the State has a legitimate and

u.s.

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

As the Court observes,

~~-~~
we4~hey interest in permitting its
....

police officers to inspect the VIN on a car stopped for a traffic
violation.

On the other side of the balance,

Ante at

~~~~

ne~

iee ~ intrusion

on resp2ndeRt's privacy

~

~

....

when

~.1-~~~~-r-~
t~

"'

~

.11

officer opened the car door and then moved

obscur~ the VIN from plain view.

.....

~

papers

This additional intrusion,

undertaken to accomplish a law enforcement purpose that the
officer was then entitled to pursue, was limited to that area of

the vehicle where the VIN is found.

While it may be better

practice for officers to ask the driver to move papers or objects
obscuring the VIN, the minor additional intrusion caused by the
officer's undertaking that step himself does not outweigh the
important public interests served by VIN inspection.
Accordingly, where a police officer lawfully stops a motor
vehicle, the officer is entitled to inspect the VIN.

If the

driver of the car is unavailable or declines to cooperate, the
Fourth Amendment presents no barrier to the officer's taking
reasonable steps, such as those reflected in this case, to
inspect the VIN.
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Justice Powell concurring.

I join the Court's opinion, but write to suggest that
we could
Appeals

reverse
because

the

federally

(V IN)

.

the
of

judgment of

the

required

the

New York Court of

unique purpose and
Vehicle

importance of

Identification

Number

As the Court notes, the VIN is analogous to a serial
number

that identifies the make, model,

place of manufacture of the vehicle.
565.4.

and

See 49 CRF Section

'!'he importance of the VIN in the federal and state

elaborate

system

of

regulating

motor

summarized in the Court's opinion.
at pp _.___ .
be

engine type,

placed

vehicles

is

well

See ante particularly

Federal Regulations now require that the VIN

somewhere

outside

Under current practice,

the

vehicle

in

plain

view.

the manufacturer locates the VIN

on the inside of the windshield of the vehicle, usually on

2.

the top of the "dashboard", where it is in plain view of
one standing beside the vehicle.
Whenever a motor vehicle is stopped lawfully because
of a
who

traffic or other
makes

the

violation
or

stop

law,

another

the police officer

officer

present,

may

observe a visible VIN and make a record of it without this
constituting either a search or a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.

The

purpose

of

the

fede:r;al

regulations

requiring the location of the VIN in plain view from the
outside
could

contemplates
it

this.

reasonably

It

is

not

be contended -

contended

that

the

nor

requirement

vio l ates any constitutional right.

,-, /

r

the
~

/1...eThe problem presented I'\
VIN,

located

,~~~Ra~~t

deliberately

on

windshield,
or

p.pj~ t.t)..

~ y this

the

fA/'4-A.i,..e.-to~-+'hl'll~--.jfF-fe:'I"'C
-~"""' ~that

case

dashboard

was

just

obscured

by

placed

there.

inadvertantly

behind

papers

the

either

~

bJ1t officer

standing on the outside \ was prevented by this obstruction
from viewing

the VIN.

Moreover,

respondent -

the driver

of the vehicle - had left it when he was directed to
"pull

over"

for

violating

the

speed

limit,

and

driving

with a cracked windshield contrary to New York State law.
The sequence of events that transpired
the

Court's

opinion.

Suffice

it

is well-stated
to

say

here

in

that

3.

respondent

had

left

his

vehicle

to

talk

to one

of

the

officer when the other officer sought to observe the VIN
This officer did what

number of the stopped automobile.

~enaib~
see

When he could not

the VIN from the outside beoause it; was eesca z ee G¥-..

>

~ PaP"et :"rr and wOh the driver having left the vehicle, the
officer

simply

looked

ins ide

sufficiently

·

rtt-empNted

~r~~~~~

papers t

·

to

remove

the

It was

b~ .

only then that the officer happened to observe a portion
of a handgun protruding from beneath the front seat.

The

Court of Appeals of New York held that this intrusion was
an unlawful search and seizure.
there were both

~

This Court today agrees

search and seizure, and justified these

this
so~

~cess.

oe.laborate

~i~

deliberately
the

vehicle,

right

to

or
I

by

the

vehicle

There

obscured

the person driving

- ~~~-

that ~

hold

officer's entry -

negligence of

would

enter

obstruction.

the

is

outside,

the.

the officer

sufficiently

is no finding

~~ ,t.{)

~~

~

to

has a

remove

in this case

leaning

legal
any

that the

through an open door

was unnecessary to achieve the lawful purpose.

If the

4.

driver

had

remained

in his seat,

as

the Court observes,

the proper procedure would have been to request that the
papers obstructing the VIN be removed.

In the absence of

compliance with such a request, an arrest would have been
lawful.
In summary,

in view of the important public purposes

served by the VIN identification system, I would hold that
where a lawful stop of a motor vehicle is made by a police
- a-...1. ~~ ~ d_~
officer, he has a legal right to see the VIN, and to

"

remove any obstruction that presents this where the driver
of

the

vehicle

cooperate.

is

either

T~.s.i.mw, ..:¥

not

available

declines

to

I lt-6-
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I

join the Court's opinion but

write ~
"\

~

that because of the unique and important governmental
interests served by inspection of the Vehicle
Identification Number (VIN), an officer making a lawful
stop of a vehicle
the VIN.

~~~R~~~o~
~~f~~~
·~e
~?

~i{~tt-d.......t&:,
has a legal rightAto inspect

Where it is not visible from outside the vehicle

or voluntarily disclosed by the driver, the officer may
enter - i.e. look into - the inside of the vehicle to the
extent necessary to read the VIN.
As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a
serial number that, by identifying certain features of the
vehicle to which it is affixed, provides an effective and

2.

reliable means for positive identification of the
vehicle.

AQeeEQj~~, ~e

VIN occupies a central position

in the elaborate federal and state regulation of
automobiles, that frequently depend on such positive
identification.

Federal regulations now direct

manufacturers to place the VIN in a location where it is
in the plain view of an observer standing outside the
vehicle.

49 C.F.R. §571.115 S4.6 (1984).

The Court has

~
~

t...c..

~

t!:A.-1

Eo~r~ answeredJlt~~estion ~

.c:.. .. ~

applying conventional Fourth Amendment analysis.

I

believe, however, that the right of an officer to observe
the VIN need not be subjected to the same level of
scrutiny that courts properly apply when there has been a

#

police intrusion of a vehicl ~

3.

~ When an officer lawfully has stopped a motor

~~trY-~
vehicle for violation of traffic or other law, the officer
1\
is entitled to inspect license and registration documents.
See Deleware v. Prouse, 440
v. Mimms, 434

u.s.

u.s.

106 (1977)

650 (1979); Pennsylvania

(per curiam).

Unquestionably, the officer also may look through the
windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without
implicating any Fourth Amendment concerns.

Respondent

does not contend, nor could it reasonably be contended,
that such action violates the federal Constitution.

The

question raised on the facts of this case, therefore, is
whether the Fourth Amendment was offended by the

~incremental intru~ resulting

from the officer's

efforts to observe the VIN once respondent's vehicle

4.

lawfully was stopped.

Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra,

at 109.
The problem presented the officer in this case was
that the V!N, located on the dashboard just behind the
windshield, was obscured by papers either deliberately or
inadvertently placed there.

The officer standing on the

outside was prevented by this obstruction from viewing the
VlN~< eover, ~spon ent- the driver of the

left it
11

~

he was directed to

~
and driving

PU11

ith a cracked windshield contrary to New York S

~

The sequence of events that transpired is well-stated in
the Court's opinion.

Suffice it to say here that

respondent had left his vehicle to talk to one of the

~

>

~ ~ when

<;; td- _/1

the other officer sought to observe the V!N

number of the stopped automobile.
his duty required.

This officer did what

When he could not see the VlN from the

the driver having left the vehicle, the

eA.

the officer happen~ t~ observe a portion of a handgun
1\.

protruding from beneath the front seat.

The Court of

Appeals of New York held that this intrusion was an
unlawful search and seizure.

This Court today agrees

there were both a search and seizure, and justified these
by reasoning familiar in automobile cases.
ln my view,

more limited one.

the Fourth Amendment question is a

1-

4<:, k..,._
o1 UJ.._
It is simply whether the officer's
1\

'*

efforts to see the VIN were unreasonable.

Where the

is obscured deliberately or by the negligence of the

~~IN

6.

person driving the vehicle, I would hold that - absent
consent - the officer has a legal right to enter the
vehicle sufficiently to remove any obstruction.

There is

no finding in this case that the officer's entry- limited
to a leaning through an open door achieve

th~lawful

purpose.

"K.()f~
was ~~ necessary to

If the driver had remained in

his seat, as the Court observes, the proper procedure
would have been to request that the papers obstructing the
VIN be removed.

In the absence of compliance with such a

request, an arrest would have been lawful.
In summary, in view of the important public purposes
served by the VIN identification system, I would hold that
where a lawful stop of a motor vehicle is made by a police
officer, he has a legal right - and often a duty - to see
the VIN, and to remove any obstruction that presents this

7.

where the driver of the vehicle is e i ther not available or
declines to cooperate.

The expectation of privacy with

respect to this motor vehicle identification is minimal.

1

1.
I do not suggest, of course, that the F
is inapplicable.
An officer could use the
'ght to
observe the VIN as a pretext for looking insi e the
vehicle for contraband or weapons, or that th entry - for
whatever purpose - was ~ more extensive than necessary
to remove any obstruction and read the numbers of the VIN.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion but write to emphasize that, because of the unique and important governmental interests
served by inspection of the Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN), an officer making a lawful stop of a vehicle has the
right and duty to inspect the VIN. Where the VIN is not
visible from outside the vehicle or voluntarily disclosed by
the driver, the officer may enter the vehicle to the extent
necessary to read the VIN.
As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a serial number that, by identifying certain features of the vehicle to
which it is affixed, provides an effective and reliable means
for positive identification of the vehicle. The VIN occupies
a central position in the elaborate federal and state regulation
of automobiles, that frequently depend on such positive identification. Federal regulations now direct manufacturers to
place the VIN in a location where it is in the plain view of an
observer standing outside the vehicle. 49 CFR § 571.115
S4.6 (1984).
The Court has answered correctly the question presented
in this case by applying conventional Fourth Amendment
analysis. I believe, however, that an officer's efforts to observe the VIN need not be subjected to the same scrutiny
that courts properly apply when police have intruded into a
vehicle to arrest or to search for evidence of crime. When an
officer lawfully has stopped a motor vehicle for a traffic in-

84-1181-CONCUR

2

NEW YORK v. CLASS

fraction, the officer is entitled to inspect license and registration documents. See Deleware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 650
(1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per
curiam). Unquestionably, the officer also may look through
the windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without implicating any Fourth Amendment concerns.
Respondent
does not contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, that
such action violates the federal Constitution. The question
raised on the facts of this case, therefore, is whether the
Fourth Amendment was offended by the incremental intrusion resulting from the officer's efforts to observe this VIN
once respondent's vehicle lawfully was stopped. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 109.
The problem for the officer was that the VIN, located on
the dashboard just behind the windshield, was obscured by
papers. The sequence of events that transpired is wellstated in the Court's opinion. Suffice it to say here that,
when respondent left his vehicle to talk to one of the officers,
the other officer sought to determine the VIN of the automobile. This officer did what his duty required. When he
could not see the VIN from outside the car, and the driver
having exited the vehicle, the officer intruded into the car to
the extent necessary to remove the papers that obstructed
his view. It was only then that he observed a handgun protruding from beneath the front seat. The Court of Appeals
of New York held that this intrusion was an unlawful search
and seizure. While agreeing that a search and seizure occurred, this Court today sustains the validity of both on reasoning familiar in cases applying Fourth Amendment principles to automobiles.
In my view, the Fourth Amendment question may be
stated simply as whether the extent of the officer's efforts to
inspect the VIN wefe: reasonable. Where the VIN is obscured deliberately or by the negligence of the driver, I

~d.~\
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would hold that, absent consent, the officer may enter the
vehicle sufficiently to remove the obstruction. There is no
finding in this case that the officer's entry-opening the car
door and reaching his hand to the dashboard-was not reasonably necessary to achieve his lawful purpose. If the
driver had remained in his seat, as the Court observes, the
officer properly should have requested the driver to remove
the papers obstructing the VIN. In the absence of compliance with such a request, an arrest would have been lawful.
In view of the important public purposes served by the
VIN system and the minimal expectation of privacy in the legally required VIN, I would hold that where a police officer
lawfully stops a motor vehicle, he may inspect the VIN, and
remove any obstruction preventing VIN inspection, where
the driver of the vehicle either is not available or declines to
cooperate.*

*I do not suggest, of course, that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in this context. An officer may not use VIN inspection as a pretext for
searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons. Nor may the officer undertake an entry more extensive than reasonably necessary to remove any
obstruction and read the VIN.
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NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. BENIGNO CLASS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK
[January -

, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion but write to emphasize that, because of the unique and important governmental interests
served by inspection of the Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN), an officer making a lawful stop of a vehicle has the
right and duty to inspect the VIN. Where the VIN is not
visible from outside the vehicle or voluntarily disclosed by
the driver, the officer may enter the vehicle to the extent
necessary to read the VIN.
As the Court explains, the VIN essentially is a serial number that, by identifying certain features of the vehicle to
which it is affixed, provides an effective and reliable means
for positive identification of the vehicle. The VIN occupies a
central position in the elaborate federal and state regulation
of automobiles, which frequently depends on such positive
identification. Federal regulations now direct manufacturers to place the VIN in a location where it is in the plain view
of an observer standing outside the vehicle. 49 CFR
§ 571.115 S4.6 (1984).
The Court has answered correctly the question presented
in this case by applying conventional Fourth Amendment
analysis. I believe, however, that an officer's efforts to observe the VIN need not be subjected t o the same scrutiny
that courts properly apply when police have intruded into a
vehicle to arrest or to search for evidence of crime. When an
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officer lawfully has stopped a motor vehicle for a traffic infraction, the officer is entitled to inspect license and registration documents. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648
(1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per
curiam). Unquestionably, the officer also may look through
the windshield, observe the VIN, and record it without implicating any Fourth Amendment concerns. Respondent does
not contend, nor could it reasonably be contended, that such
action violates the federal Constitution. The question raised
on the facts of this case, therefore, is whether the Fourth
Amendment was offended by the incremental intrusion resulting from the officer's efforts to observe this VIN once respondent's vehicle lawfully was stopped. Cf. Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, supra, at 109.
The problem for the officer was that the VIN, located on
the dashboard just behind the windshield, was obscured by
papers. The sequence of events that transpired is wellstated in the Court's opinion. Suffice it to say here that,
when respondent left his vehicle to talk to one of the officers,
the other officer sought to determine the VIN of the automobile. This officer did what his duty required. Because he
could not see the VIN from outside the car, and because the
driver had exited the vehicle, the officer entered the car to
the extent necessary to move the papers covering the VIN.
It was only then that he observed a handgun protruding from
beneath the front seat. The Court of Appeals of New York
held that this intrusion was an unlawful search. While
agreeing that a search occurred, this Court today sustains
the officer's action on reasoning familiar in cases applying
Fourth Amendment principles to automobiles.
In my view, the Fourth Amendment question may be
stated simply as whether the officer's efforts to inspect the
VIN were reasonable. There is no finding in this case that
the officer's entry into respondent's vehicle-opening the
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door and reaching his hand to the dashboard-was not reasonably necessary to achieve his lawful purpose. If respondent had remained in his seat, as the Court observes, the officer properly should have requested him to remove the papers
obstructing the VIN. In the absence of compliance with
such a request, an arrest would have been lawful. Cf. People v. Ellis, 62 N. Y. 2d 393, 477 N. Y. S. 2d 106, 465 N. E.
2d 826 (1984) (on lawful traffic stop, officers properly arrested driver for failure to produce license or other
identification).
In view of the important public purposes served by the
VIN system and the minimal expectation of privacy in the
VIN, I would hold that where a police officer lawfully stops a
motor vehicle, he may inspect the VIN, and remove any obstruction preventing such inspection, where the driver of the
vehicle either is unwilling or unable to cooperate.*

*I do not suggest, of course, that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable in this context. An officer may not use VIN inspection as a pretext for
searching a vehicle for contraband or weapons. Nor may the officer undertake an entry more extensive than reasonably necessary to remove any
obstruction and read the VIN.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 84-1181

NEW YORK, PETITIONER v. BENIGNO CLASS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF NEW YORK
[January-, 1986]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we must decide whether, in order to observe a
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible from
outside an automobile, a police officer may reach into the passenger compartment of a vehicle to move papers obscuring
the VIN after its driver has been stopped for a traffic violation and has exited the car. We hold that, in these circumstances, the police officer's action does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
I
On the afternoon of May 11, 1981, New York City police
officers Lawrence Meyer and William MeN amee observed respondent Benigno Class driving above the speed limit in a car
with a cracked . windshield. Both driving with a cracked
windshield and speeding are traffic violations under New
York law. See N.Y. Vehicle & Traffic Law §§375(22),
1180(d) (McKinney 1970). Respondent followed the officers'
ensuing directive to pull over. Respondent then emerged
from .his car and approached Officer Meyer.
Officer
McNamee went directly to respondent's vehicle. Respondent provided Officer Meyer with a registration certificate and
' proof of insurance, butstated that he had no driver's license.
Meanwhile, Officer McNamee opened the door of respondent's car to look for the Vehicle Inspection Number (VIN),
which is located on the left door jamb in automobiles manufactured before 1969. When the officer did not find the VIN

•
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on the door jamb, he reached into the interior of respondent's
car to move some papers obscuring the area of the dashboard
where the VIN is located in all post-1969 models. In doing
so, Officer McNamee saw the handle of a gun protruding
about one inch from underneath the driver's seat. The officer seized the gun, and respondent was promptly arrested.
Respondent was also issued summonses for his traffic
violations.
It is undisputed that the police officers had no reason to
suspect that respondent's car was stolen, that it contained
contraband, or that respondent had committed an offense
other than the traffic violations. Nor is it disputed that respondent committed the traffic violations with which he was
charged, and that, as of the day of the arrest, he had not been
issued a valid driver's license.
Mter the state trial court denied a motion to suppress the
gun as evidence, respondent was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. See N. Y. Penal
Law § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980). The Supreme Court for
Bronx County upheld the conviction without opinion. The
New York Court of Appeals reversed. It reasoned that the
police officer's "intrusion . . . was undertaken to obtain
information and it exposed . . . hidden areas" of the car, and
"therefore constituted a search." People v. Class, 63
N. Y.2d 491, 495, 472 N. E. 2d 1009, 1011 (1984). Although
it recognized that a search for a VIN generally involves a
minimal intrusion because of its limited potential locations,
and agreed that there is a compelling law-enforcement interest in positively identifying vehicles involved in accidents or
auto thefts, the court thought it decisive that the facts of this
case "reveal no reason for the officer to suspect other· criminal activity [besides the traffic infraction] or to act to protect
his own safety." !d., at 495-496. The state statutory provision that authorizes officers to demand that drivers reveal
their VIN "provided no justification for the officer's entry of
[respondent's] car." ld., at 497. If the officer had taken
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advantage of that statute and asked to see the VIN, respondent could have moved the papers away himself and no intrusion would have occurred. In the absence of any justification for the search besides the traffic infraction, the New
York Court of Appeals ruled that the gun must be excluded
from evidence.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), and now
reverse.
II
Respondent asserts that this Court is without jurisdiction
to hear this case because the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals rests on an adequate and independent state
ground. We disagree.
The opinion of the New York Court of Appeals mentions
the New York Constitution but once, and then only in direct
conjunction with the United Sfates Constitution.
63
N. Y.2d, at 493, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1010. Cf. Michigan ·v.
Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1043 (1983). The opinion below makes
use of both federal and New York cases in its analysis, generally citing both for the same proposition. See, e. g., 63
N. Y.2d, at 494, 495, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1011. The opinion
lacks the requisite "plain statement" that it rests on state
grounds. Michigan v. Long, supra, at 1042, 1044. Accordingly, our holding in Michigan v. Long is directly applicable
here:
"[W]hen ... a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the
federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of
any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of
the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it
did because it believed that federal law required it to do
so." /d., at 1040-1041.
See also California v. Carney,-- U.· S. - - , - - n. 1
(1985).
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Respondent's claim that the opinion below rested on independent and adequate state statutory grounds is also without
merit. The New York Court of Appeals did not hold that
§401 of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibited the
search at issue here, but, in rejecting an assertion of petitioner, merely held that § 401 "provided no justification" for
a search. .63 N. Y.2d, at 497, 472 N. E. 2d, at 1013 (emphasis added). In determining that the police officer's action
was prohibited, the court below looked to the Federal Constitution, not the State's statute. Moreover, New York adheres to the general rule that, when statutory construction
can resolve a case, courts should not decide constitutional
issues. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U. S. 288, 346-347 (Brandeis, J., concurring); In re Peters v.
New York City Housing Authority, 307 N. Y. 519, 527, 121
N. E. 2d 529, ·531 (1954). Since the New York Court of Appeals discussed both statutory and constitutional grounds, we
may infer that the court believed the statutory issue insufficient to resolve the case. The discussion of the statute
therefore could not have constituted an independent and adequate state ground.
III
A
The officer here, after observing respondent commit two
traffic violations and exit the car, attempted to determine the
VIN of respondent's automobile. In reaching to remove papers obscuring the VIN, the officer intruded into the passenger compartment of the vehicle.
The VIN consists of more than a dozen digits, unique to
each vehicle and required on all cars and trucks. See 49
CFR § 571.115 (1984). The VIN is roughly analogous to a
serial number, but it can be deciphered to reveal not only the
place of the automobile in the manufacturer's production run,
but the make, model, engine type, and place of manufacture
of the vehicle. See id. § 565.4.

84-1181-0PINION
NEW YORK v. CLASS

5

The VIN is a significant thread in the web of regulation of
the automobile. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 2189 (1978).
The ease with which the VIN allows identification of a particular vehicle assists the various levels of government in
many ways. For the federal government, the VIN improves
the efficacy of recall campaigns, and assists researchers in
determining the risks of driving various makes and models of
automobiles. In combination with state insurance laws, the
VIN reduces the number of those injured in accidents who go
uncompensated for lack of insurance. In conjunction with
the state's registration requirements and safety inspections,
the VIN helps to ensure that automobile operators are driving safe vehicles. By making auto theft more difficult, the
VIN safeguards not only property but life and limb. See 33
Fed. Reg. 10,207 (1968) (noting that stolen vehicles are
disproportionately likely to be involved in automobile
accidents).
To facilitate the VIN's usefulness for these laudable governmental purposes, federal law requires that the VIN be
placed in the plain view of someone outside the automobile:
"The VIN for passenger cars [manufactured after 1969]
shall be located inside the passenger compartment. It
shall be readable, without moving any part of the vehicle, through the vehicle glazing under daylight lighting
conditions by an observer having 20/20 vision (Snellen)
whose eye point is located outside the vehicle adjacent to
the left windshield pillar. Each character in the VIN
subject to this paragraph shall have a minimum height
of 4 mm." 49 CFR §571.115 (S 4.6) (1984) (emphasis
added).
In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 658 (1979), we recognized the "vital interest" in highway safety and the various
programs that contribute to that interest. In light of the important interests served by the VIN, the federal and state
governments are amply justified in making it a part of the
web of pervasive regulation that surrounds the automobile,
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and in requiring its placement in an area ordinarily in plain
view from outside the passenger compartment.
B
A citizen does not surrender all the protections of the
Fourth Amendment by entering an automobile. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 663; Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U. S. 266, 269 (1973). Nonetheless, the state's
intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or
elsewhere, cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation
unless the area is one in which there is a "constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, - - (1984);
Maryland v. M aeon, - - U. S. - - , - - (1985).
The Court has recognized that the physical characteristics
of an automobile· and its use result in a lessened expectation
of privacy therein:
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and .it seldom
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public
scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its
occupants and its contents are in plain view." Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
Moreover, automobiles are justifiably the subject of pervasive regulation by the state. Every operator of a motor vehicle must expect that the state, in enforcing its regulations,
will intrude to some extent upon that operator's privacy:
"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subject to pervasive
and continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements.
As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety
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equipment are not in proper working order." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 368 (1976).
See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441-442 (1973);
California v. Carney, supra, at--.
The factors that generally diminish the reasonable expectation of privacy in automobiles are applicable a fortiori to the
VIN. As we have discussed above, the VIN plays an important part in the pervasive regulation by the government of
the automobile. A motorist must surely expect that such
regulation will on occasion require the State to determine the
VIN of his or her vehicle, and the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby diminished.
This is especially true in the case of a driver who has committed a traffic violation. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at
659 ("The foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle
safety regulations . . . is acting upon observed violations.
Vehicle stops for traffic violations occur countless times each
day; and on these occasions, license and registration papers
are subject to inspection and drivers without them will be ascertained.") (emphasis added). In addition, it is unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an object required
by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain view from
the exterior of the automobile. The VIN's mandated visibility makes it more similar to the exterior of the car than to the
trunk or glove compartment. The exterior of a car, of
course, is thrust into the public eye, and thus to examine it
does not constitute a "search." See Cardwell v. Lewis,
supra, at 588-589. In sum, because of the important role
played by the VIN in the pervasive governmental regulation
of the automobile and the efforts by the federal government
to ensure that the VIN is placed in plain view, we hold that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN.
We think it makes no difference that the papers in respondent's car obscured the VIN from the plain view of the officer.
We have recently emphasized that efforts to restrict access
to an area do not generate a reasonable expectation of pri-
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vacy where none would otherwise exist. See Oliver v.
United States, supra, at-- (placement of "No Trespassing"
signs on secluded property does not create "legitimate privacy interest" in marijuana fields). Here, where the object
at issue is an identification number behind the transparent
windshield of an automobile driven upon the public roads, we
believe that the placement of the obscuring papers was insufficient to create a privacy interest in the VIN. The mere
viewing of the formerly obscured VIN was not, therefore, a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

c
The evidence that respondent sought to have suppressed
was not the VIN, however, but a gun, the handle of which
the officer saw from the interior of the car while reaching for
the papers that covered the VIN. While the interior of an
automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy
that exist with respect to one's home; a car's interior as a
whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police. We agree
with the New York Court of Appeals that the intrusion into
that space con~tituted a "search." 63 N. Y.2d, at 495, 472
N. E. 2d, at 1011. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 653
("stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' . . . even though the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention quite brief"). We must
decide, therefore, whether this search was constitutionally
permissible.
If respondent had remained in the car, the police would
have been justified in asking him to move the papers obscuring the VIN. New York law authorizes a demand by officers
to see the VIN, see 63 N. Y.2d, at 496-497, 472 N. E. 2d, at
1012-1013, and even if the .state law were not explicit on this
point we have no difficulty in concluding that a demand to inspect the VIN, like a demand to see license and registration
papers, is within the scope of police authority pursuant to a
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traffic violation stop. See Prouse, supra, at 659. If respondent had stayed in his vehicle and acceded to such a
request from the officer, the officer would not have needed
to intrude into the passenger compartment. Respondent
chose, however, to exit the vehicle without removing the papers that covered the VIN; the officer chose to conduct his
search without asking respondent to return to the car. We
must therefore decide whether the officer acted within the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment in conducting the search.
We hold that he did.
Keeping the driver of a vehicle in the car during a routine
traffic stop is probably the typical police practice. See D.
Schultz and D. Hunt, Traffic' Investigation and Enforcement
17 (1983). Nonetheless, out of a concern for the safety of the
police, the Court has held that officers may, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, exercise their discretion to require a
driver who commits a traffic violation to exit the vehicle even
though they lack any particularized reason for believing the
driver possesses a weapon. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U. S. 106, 108-111 (1977) (per curiam). While we impute to
respondent no propensity for violence, and while we are conscious of the fact that respondent here voluntarily left the vehicle, the facts of this case may be used to illustrate one of the
principal justifications for the discretion given police officers
by Pennsylvania v. Mimms: while in the driver's seat, respondent had a loaded pistol at hand. Mimms allows an officer to guard against that possibility by requiring the driver
to exit the car briefly. Clearly, Mimms also allowed the officers here to detain respondent briefly outside the car that he
voluntarily exited while they completed their investigation.
The question remains, however, as to whether the officers
could not only effect the seizure of respondent necessary to
detain him briefly outside the vehicle, but also effect a search
for the VIN that may have been necessary only because of
that detention. The pistol beneath the seat did not, of
course, disappear when respondent closed the car door be-
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hind him. To have returned respondent immediately to the
automobile would have placed the officers in the same situation that the holding in Mimms allows officers to avoid-permitting an individual being detained to have possible access
to a dangerous weapon and the benefit of the partial concealment provided by the car's exterior. See Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, supra, at 110. In light of the danger to the officers'
safety that would have been presented by returning respondent immediately to his car, we think the search to obtain the
VIN was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment by its terms prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures. We have noted that
"there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.' Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523,
534-535, 536-537 (1967). And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, justifiably warrant
that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)
(footnote omitted) (brackets as in Terry).
This test generally means that searches must be conducted
pursuant to a warrant backed by probable cause. See
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 105-109 (1965);
United States v. Karo, --U.S.--,-- (1984). When
a search or seizure has as its immediate object a search for a
weapon, however, we have struck the balance to allow the
weighty interest in the safety of police officers to justify warrantless searches based only on a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972). Such searches
are permissible despite their substantial intrusiveness. See
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 24-25 (search was "a severe, though
brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and . . .
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must surely [have] b[een] an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience").
When the officer's safety is less directly served by the detention, something more than objectively justifiable suspicion
is necessary to justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip in
favor of the legality of the governmental intrusion. In
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, at 107, the officers had personally observed the seized individual in the commission of a
traffic offense before requesting that he exit his vehicle. In
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 693 (1981), the officers
had obtained a warrant to search the house that the person
seized was leaving when they came upon him. While the
facts in Pennsylvania v. Mimms and Michigan v. Summers
differ in some respects from the facts of this case, the similarities are strong enough that the balancing of governmental
interests against governmental intrusion undertaken in those
cases is also appropriate here. All three of the factors involved in Mimms and Summers are present in this case: the
safety of the officers was served by the governmental intrusion; the intrusion was minimal; and the search stemmed
from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual
affected by the search. Indeed, here the officer's probable
cause stemmed from directly observing respondent commit a
violation of the law.
When we undertake the necessary balancing of "the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion," United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 703 (1983), the conclusion that
the search here was permissible follows. As we recognized
in Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 658, the governmental interest in highway safety served by obtaining the VIN is of
the first order, and the particular method of obtaining the
VIN here was justified by a concern for the officer's safety.
The "critical" issue of the intrusiveness of the government's
action, United States v. Place, supra, at 722 (BLACKMUN, J.,

•
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concurring in the judgment), also here weighs in favor of allowing the search. The search was focused in its objective
and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective.
The search was far less intrusive than a formal arrest, which
would have been permissible for a traffic offense under New
York law, seeN. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155 (McKinney 1970 & 1984-1985 Pocket Part); id., Criminal Procedure
Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and little more intrusive than a demand that the respondent-under the eyes of the officersmove the papers himself. The VIN, which was the clear initial objective of the officer, is by law present in one of two
· locations-either inside the door jamb, or atop the dashboard
and thus ordinarily in plain view of someone outside the automobile. Neither of those locations is subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The officer here checked both those
locations, and only those two locations. The officer did not
root about the interior of the respondent's automobile before
proceeding to examine the VIN. He did not reach into any
compartments or open any containers. He did not even intrude into the interior at all until after he had checked the
door jamb for the VIN. When he did intrude, the officer
simply reached directly for the unprotected space where the
VIN was located to move the offending papers. We hold
that this search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the fact that the officers observed respondent commit two traffic violations. Any other
conclusion would expose police officers to potentially grave
risks without significantly reducing the intrusiveness of the
ultimate conduct-viewing the VIN-which, as we have said,
the officers were entitled to do as part of an undoubtedly justified traffic stop.
We note th~t our holding today does not authorize police
qfficers to enter a vehicle to obtain a dashboard-mounted
VIN when the VIN is visible from outside the automobile.
If the VIN is in the plain view of someone outside the vehicle,
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there is no justification for governmental intrusion into the
passenger compartment to see it.*
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

*Petitioner invites us to hold that respondent's status as an unlicensed
driver deprived him of any reasonable expectations of privacy in the vehicle, because the officers would have been within their discretion to have
prohibited respondent from driving the car away, to have impounded the
car, and to have later conducted an inventory search thereof. Cf. South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976) (police may conduct inventory
search of car impounded for multiple parking violations); Nix v. Williams,
467 U. S. 431 (1984) (discussing the "inevitable discovery" exception to the
exclusionary rule). Petitioner also argues that there can be no Fourth
Amendment violation here because the police could have arrested respondent, seeN. Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law,§ 155 (McKinney 1970 & 1984-1985
Pocket Part); id., Criminal Procedure Law, § 140.10(1) (1981), and could
then have searched the passenger compartment at the time of arrest, cf.
New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. · 454 (1981),· or arrested respondent and
searched the car after impounding it pursuant to the arrest, see Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973). We do not", however, reach those
questions here.

.-uprtntt Clf&tltrl qf lfr.t ~t.t~ .-tat.t•

'JfuJrin!lhrn. ~. Clf.
CH ... MIIERS

20~~~

/

0~

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 31, 1986

Re:

84-1181 - New York v. Class

Dear Bill•
Please join me in your dissent.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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February 4, 1986

Re:

84-1181 - New York v. Class

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

February 4, 1986

No. 84-1181, New York v. Class

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

--Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference
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